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COMBINING A SECTION 333 LIQUIDATION
WITH A "C" REORGANIZATION
Section 331 of the Internal Revenue Code of 19541 allows a share-
holder's gain upon the complete liquidation of a corporation to be
taxed at capital gains rates. Section 333 2-grants relief from section 331
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 331(a)(1) [hereinafter cited as CODE], provides: "Amounts
distributed in complete liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in full payment in
exchange for the stock."
2 Id. § 333 provides in pertinent part:
(a) General rule.-In the case of property distributed in complete liquidation
of a domestic corporation (other than a collapsible corporation to which section
341(a) applies), if-
(1) the liquidation is made in pursuance of a plan of liquidation adopted
on or after June 22, 1954, and
(2) the distribution is in complete cancellation or redemption of all
the stock, and the transfer of all the property under the liquidation occurs
within some one calendar month,
then in the case of each qualified electing shareholder (as defined in subsection
(c)) gain on the shares owned by him at the time of the adoption of the plan of liq-
uidation shall be recognized only to the extent provided in subsections (e) and (f).
(c) Qualified electing shareholders-For purposes of this section, the term
"qualified electing shareholder" means a shareholder (other than an excluded
corporation) of any class of stock (whether or not entitled to vote on the adoption
of the plan of liquidation) who is a shareholder at the time of the adoption of
such plan, and whose written election to have the benefits of subsection (a) has
been made and filed in accordance with subsection (d), but-
(1) in the case of a shareholder other than a corporation, only if written
elections have been so filed by shareholders (other than corporations) who
at the time of the adoption of the plan of liquidation are owners of stock
possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power (exclusive
of voting power possessed by stock owned by corporations) of all classes of
stock entitled to vote on the adoption of such plan of liquidation ....
(d) Making and filing of elections.-The written elections referred to in sub-
section (c) must be made and filed in such manner as to be not in contravention
of regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate. The filing must be
within 30 days after the date of the adoption of the plan of liquidation.
(e) Noncorporate shareholders.-In the case of a qualified electing share-
holder other than a corporation-
(1) there shall be recognized, and treated as a dividend, so much of the
gain as is not in excess of his ratable share of the earnings and profits of the
corporation accumulated after February 28, 1913, such earnings and profits to
be determined as of the close of the month in which the transfer in liquida-
tion occurred under subsection (a)(2), but without diminution by reason of
distributions made during such month; but by including in the computation
thereof all amounts accrued up to the date on which the transfer of all the
property under the liquidation is completed; and
(2) there shall be recognized, and treated as short-term or long-term
capital gain, as the case may be, so much of the remainder of the gain as
is not in excess of the amount by which the value of that portion of the
assets received by him which consists of money, or of stock or securities
acquired by the corporation after December 31, 1953, exceeds his ratable share
of such earnings and profits.
This provision was first enacted in the Revenue Act of 1938 and applied to all
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for non-corporate shareholders of corporations with little or no earn-
ings and profits but substantial appreciated assets by, in effect, post-
poning the recognition of gain; appreciated properties distributed to
a shareholder in a section 333 liquidation assume the basis of the stock
given up by the shareholder,4 and any gain is taxed only at the time
that the shareholder sells the appreciated assets. Gain will be recognized
at the time of distribution, however, if money, stock, or securities are
distributed, or where there are earnings or profits.6
The 1954 Code carefully defines in section 368 transactions that
"effect only a readjustment of continuing interest in property under
modified corporate forms."6 Such reorganizations receive special tax
treatment regarding the recognition of gain to the transferor corpora-
tion and its shareholders. A "C" reorganization consists of the transfer
by one corporation of "substantially all" of its assets to another corpora-
tion "in exchange solely for all or a part of [the transferee's] voting
stock."17 On such an exchange, the transferor corporation has no recog-
nized gain8 and can distribute the stock it holds in the transferee corpo-
ration to its shareholders in exchange for its own stock. The recipient
shareholder recognizes no gain on this exchange except to the extent
that cash, property, or other "boot" has been distributed. 9 The share-
holder's basis in the new stock remains his basis in the old stock; again
the tax is postponed until a sale of the new stock by the shareholder.10
liquidation plans adopted after January 1, 1938, and executed during December of 1938.
J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAws, 1938-1861,
at 49-52 (1938). The 1943 Act restored a provision for liquidations in 1944 and the 1950
and 1951 Acts contained a provision for the years 1951 and 1952, respectively. 1 J. SaID-
aLAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME AND ExcEss PROFITS TAX LAWS,
1953-1939, at 1541-50 (1954). Section 833 of the 1954 Act is the first such provision of
indefinite duration.
3 Although corporate shareholders are given relief by CODE § 33(f), this note will
be concerned with § 333 liquidations by non-corporate shareholders only.
4 Id. § 334(c). Proper adjustment to basis must be made for any money received
by the shareholder or gain recognized to him. Id.
5 Id. §§ 333(e)(1)-(2).
6 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955).
7 CODE § 368(a)(1)(C) defines a "C" reorganization as:
[T]he acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of its
voting stock (or in exchange solely for all or a part of the voting stock of a
corporation which is in control of the acquiring corporation), of substantially all
of the properties of another corporation, but in determining whether the ex-
change is solely for stock the assumption by the acquiring corporation of a
liability of the other, or the fact that property acquired is subject to a liability,
shall be disregarded ....
8 Id. § 361(a) states: "No gain or loss shall be recognized if a corporation a party to
a reorganization exchanges property, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, solely
for stock or securities in another corporation a party to the reorganization."
9 Id. §§ 354(a), 356(a)-(b).
10 Id. § 358(a).
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A combination of these tvo sections-a 'section 368(a)(1)(c) reoi-'
ganization and a section 333 liquidation-in separate but successive
transactions would enable the shareholders in the transferor-liquidating
corporation to receive some stock and some appreciated assets without
the recognition of gain or loss on either of the distributions.
Consider the following hypothetical situation: John Elderly is the-
sole shareholder in Home Antiques, Inc. Despite a fine inventory,
Home Antiques has not proved profitable and Elderly wishes to discard
the corporate form of business and perhaps, due to his age, forego
operation of the business.
National Antiques, Inc., approaches Elderly, seeking a consolida-
tion of their businesses through a "C" reorganization. Elderly hesitates,
however, because he wishes to retain several antiques to decorate his
home. He realizes that if he obtains these appreciated assets in a section
354 distribution pursuant to the plan of reorganization they will be tax-
able as "boot" under section 356. Since Elderly will receive no cash as a
result of the section 354 distribution, he desires to postpone the tax on
the gain from the appreciated assets.
After consultation, Home Antiques proceeds with a plan of "C"
reorganization and transfers its real estate, client lists, accounts re-
ceivable, and ninety-two percent of its inventory to National. Home
Antiques retains the remaining eight percent of the antiques.
Subsequent to the reorganization and a section 354 distribution
of the National stock to Elderly for most of his Home Antiques stock,
Home Antiques files a plan of section 333 liquidation and liquidates
within one month.1' The remaining antiques are distributed to Elderly
without the recognition of gain, and they assume the basis of his re-
maining Home Antiques stock given up in exchange.
I
THE LEGITIMACY OF THE COMBINATION UNDER THE CODE
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 neither expressly allows nor
expressly forbids the combination contemplated. Thus, whether it is
permitted must be determined by reference to actions taken by courts
considering similar combinations and to the language and legislative his-
tory of the sections.
A. Combining a Spin-Off and a Reorganization
A closely analogous combination of Subchapter C sections has re-
cently come before the courts and the Commissioner of Internal Reve-
11 Id. § 333(a)(2).
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nue and has received general approval. Corporations composed of two
distinct businesses have used a section 35512 spin-off to separate one of
these businesses so that the other could be transferred in a subsequent
reorganization. Section 355 allows non-recognition of gain or loss upon
a "spin-off," which is "the separation ... of two or more existing busi-
nesses formerly operated, directly or indirectly, by a single corpora-
tion."' 3 Although the reorganization constitutes the second transaction
in this combination, analogous questions of construction of relief sec-
tions, compatibility of Subchapter C sections, legislative history, and
step transactions are all presented.
In Curtis v. United States"4 and Commissioner v. Morris Trust,15
taxpayers attempted spin-offs prior to "A" reorganizations. The Sixth
and Fourth Circuits reached opposite conclusions as to the validity of
the combination, but the reasoning of both courts suggests support for
consolidating sections 333 and 368. The Curtis court held the combina-
tion invalid only because the spin-off failed to comply precisely with
the section 355 requirements; that is, the court declared that when the
parent corporation in a spin-off became the acquired corporation in the
subsequent reorganization, it could not be "engaged immediately after
the distribution in the active conduct of a trade or business,"' 6 as re-
quired by section 355. To justify its technical approach, the court noted
that "[e]xemptions from general taxation statutes are to be strictly
construed."17 The court neither denied the compatibility of the sections
nor invoked the step transaction analysis that had been noted in the
district court's decision.' 8
The Fourth Circuit, under similar facts in Morris Trust, declared
that a literal construction of section 355 "is quite consistent with the
prior history" of the section-Congress intended to limit the continued
business test of section 355 to the period "immediately after the distri-
bution."'9 Here, according to the court, there was no violation of this
underlying principle because "[t]here was no empty formalism, no
utilization of empty corporate structures, no attempt to recast a taxable
transaction in nontaxable form and no withdrawal of liquid assets." 20
12 Id. § 855.
'3 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1(a) (1955).
14 336 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1964).
15 367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966).
16 36 F.2d at 719, quoting CoDE § 355(b)(1)(A).
17 Id. at 721.
18 Curtis v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 885, 886 (W.D. Ohio 1963), aff'd, 336 F.2d
714 (6th Cir. 1964).
19 867 F.2d at 798 (emphasis added).
20 Id. at 799.
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This court, unlike the Sixth Circuit, determined that section 355 was
technically complied with despite the subsequent merger of the parent
corporation.21 Again, the step transaction analysis did not enter into
the decision.
Two recent revenue rulings are concerned with similar combina-
tions. Revenue Ruling 70-434 allows a spin-off and "B" reorganization
combination where the parent company in the spin-off remains intact
as a subsidiary of the acquiring corporation in the reorganization. 22
Revenue Ruling 70-225 denies a more complicated combination of
these sections in which the stock of the spun-off corporation is distri-
buted to the parent's shareholder under section 368(a)(1)(D), and the
shareholder then transfers the stock to another corporation in a "B"
reorganization. The denial relies on application of the step transaction
analysis to establish the absence of control required by section 368(a)
(1)(D) and the failure of a stock-for-stock transaction required for a
"B" reorganization. 23 Thus, the revenue rulings support the court deci-
sions but raise the possibility of step transaction analysis if integration
of the transactions would result in failure to comply with the technical
statutory requirements of one or more of the sections involved.
Neither the Internal Revenue Service nor the courts questioned
21 Id. at 799-800. The Internal Revenue Service agreed to follow the Morris Trust
holding in Rev. Rul. 68-603, 1968-2 Cum. BULL. 148.
22 Rev. Rul. 70-434, 1970 INT. REv. BULL. No. 84, at 11.
28 Rev. Rul. 70-225, 1970 INT. REv. BULL. No. 19, at 15:
R, a corporation with one shareholder, A, for many years has operated a
taxicab business and a car rental business. T, an unrelated widely held corpora-
tion, desired to acquire R's car rental business. Pursuant to a plan, R transferred
the assets of its car rental business to a newly formed corporation, S, in exchange
for all the stock of S and distributed the stock of S to its sole shareholder (A)
in a transaction intended to qualify under sections 368(a)(1)(D) and 355 of the
Code. As part of the prearranged plan, A immediately exchanged all his S stock
for some of the outstanding voting stock of T in an exchange intended to meet
the requirements of section 368(a)(1)(B) of the Code.
[I]n the instant case, the transfer by R of part of its assets to S in ex-
change for all the stock of S followed by the distribution of the S stock to A
and by the transfer of the S stock to T by A in exchange for T stock is a series
of integrated steps which likewise may not be considered independently of each
other. Accordingly, neither R nor its sole shareholder A is in control of S after
the transfer and the transaction does not constitute a reorganization under section
368(a)(1)(D) of the Code nor a transfer under section 351 of the Code. Section
368(a)(1)(B) of the Code is not applicable to the transaction, since in effect R
transferred part of its assets to T in exchange for part of the T stock, rather than
T having acquired all the stock of a previously existing corporation solely in ex-
change for its own voting stock.
Accordingly, the receipt by A of the stock of T is not a distribution to which
section 355 of the Code applies. The fair market value of the stock of T is taxable
to A as a distribution by R under section 501 of the Code. In addition, gain or
loss is recognized to R on the transaction.
1971]
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the compatibility of these Subchapter C sections. In fact, the Fourth
Circuit declared that it could not find "any support for the Commis-
sioner's suggestion of incompatibility between substantially contem-
poraneous divisive and amalgamating reorganizations" in either the
Code or its legislative history.24
B. "Corporate Distributions and Adjustments"
All of the pertinent sections used in the proposed combination fall
within Subchapter C of the Code, which concerns corporate distribu-
tions and adjustments. Although limits have been placed on sections
333, 354, and 356, none prohibits the combination proposed herein; a
corporation seeking a section 333 liquidation cannot take advantage of
a section 337 sale of assets during the liquidation, 25 and distributions
under sections 354 or 356 are not to be included within the section 337
rules for the recognition of gain or loss to minority shareholders in cer-
tain liquidations.26
Congress's sole concern over the combination of section 333 with the
reorganization sections is manifested in section 333(g) which prescribes
rules for "would have been" personal holding companies. 27 Within
these rules, which provide long-term capital gains treatment to certain
monies that would otherwise receive dividend treatment, Congress
specifically excluded "earnings and profits to which the corporation
succeeds... pursuant to any corporate reorganization .... "28 But no-
where does section 333 deny its advantages to a corporation that con-
tinues to hold property subsequent to a reorganization.
Indeed, it is clear that the transferor corporation in a reorganiza-
tion need not liquidate after a reorganization.29 Moreover, it has been
noted that unwanted assets in a corporate reorganization could be kept
24 867 F.2d at 800. See generally Cohen, Tax-Free Acquisition of Part of a Corpora-
tion's Assets by Combining a Spin-Off with a Unifying Reorganization, N.Y.U. 26TH INsr.
ON FED. TAx. 849 (1968); Massee, Section 355: Disposal of Unwanted Assets in Connection
with a Reorganization, 22 TAx L. REv. 439 (1967).
25 CODE § 387(c)(1)(B).
26 Treas. Reg. § 1.337-5(a) (1961).
27 "Would have been" personal holding companies were created in 1964 when Congress
tightened up the provisions for personal holding companies. Any corporation that would
have been a personal holding company under the newly created provisions in one of two
of its preceding taxable years was granted special deductions and was allowed special
liquidation treatment if it liquidated before 1967. B. BrrrxEa & J. EusicE, FEDERAL
INcOME TAXATiON OF CORORATONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 256 (2d student ed. 1966).
28 CODE § 333(g)(1).
29 Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 878, 886 (1935); John A. Nelson Co. v.
Helvering, 296 U.S. 874, 877 (1935). A recent revenue ruling attempts to limit the
application of these Supreme Court decisions, however. Rev. Rul. 68-858, 1968.2 CuB.
BUL. 156.
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by the transferor after the reorganization and after a section 354 dis-
tribution of stock.30
The House Report on the 1954 Revenue Act contained a provision
that would have required liquidation of the transferor corporation in
a "C" reorganization under sections 354 and 356.31 This provision was
deleted from the bill in final form, but the subject came before Con-
gress again in 1959 when a Subchapter C Advisory Group recommended
a similar provision to "prevent a transferor corporation from distri-
buting the stock of the transferee without tax to its shareholders while
at the same time retaining the boot for an ultimate complete liquida-
tion of the transferor (or a sale of its stock by its shareholders) at capital
gains rates."32 The Advisory Group objected primarily to distributions
of earnings and profits as capital gains under a section 331 liquidation
subsequent to a reorganization. Again Congress refused to act, willingly
leaving open the path for a liquidation subsequent to, but not in pur-
suance of, a reorganization.
II
Ti "SUBSTANTIALLY ALL" TEST AND STEP TRANSACTION ANALYSIS
Were the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to challenge the
proposed combination of sections 333 and 368, his initial argument
would probably be that Home Antiques failed to satisfy the "substan-
tially all" requirement for "C" reorganizations. Alternatively, he might
contend that the section 333 liquidation is invalid through application
of the "step transaction" analysis created by the courts. As can be seen,
the two approaches produce opposite results: success of the first negates
the reorganization but allows the liquidation, and success of the second
allows the reorganization but negates the liquidation.83
30 Beck, How To Dispose of Unwanted Assets of the Seller in Corporate Distributions,
N.Y.U. 21sr INsT. ON Fm. TAx. 1095, 1105 (1963); Leake, Problems in Corporate Ac-
quisitions, 13 TAx L. REv. 67, 80-82 (1957).
81 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., at 40, A134 (1954).
32 RESED REPORT ON CORPORATE DISTRIMUTIONS AND ADJUSTmENTs To ACCOMPANY
SUBCHAPTER C ADVISORY GROUP PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 79 (1958).
83 Of the two arguments, "substantially all" is the easier to answer but probably
the more important to Home Antiques. If the step transaction analysis is applied to the
transactions, the distribution of the antiques to Elderly wil be treated as § 356 "boot"
and taxed as capital gains (not as § 356(a)(2) dividends because there are no earnings
and profits). If the "substantially all" requirement is unsatisfied, however, the reorganiza-
tion would be invalid and the transaction treated as a sale, resulting in tax on the gain.
1971] .
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:665
A. "Substantially All"
In recent years the statistical and qualitative approaches to the
"substantially all" requirement have merged in decisions of the Com-
missioner and the courts. Two early cases established the statistical
rule that transfer of eighty-six percent of a corporation's assets would
meet the requirement84 but that sixty-eight percent would not.35 This
approach has since been modified in revenue rulings by consideration
of "the nature of the properties retained by the transferor, the purpose
of the retention, and the amount thereof." 3 The courts have looked
particularly to the disposition of the operating assets of the transferor 37
and to the use of retained assets where larger retentions are involved.38
Essentially involved is the interpretation of a statutory provision which
offers no guidelines, but the legislative history of which belies a statis-
tical approach.8 9
The hypothetical Home Antiques transfer satisfies both the statis-
tical and qualitative measures of the "substantially all" requirement.
A transfer of more than ninety percent of a corporation's assets almost
ensures approval.40 Moreover, the antiques retained do not impair
Home Antiques's operating assets, and Home Antiques will not use
34 Commissioner v. First Nat'l Bank, 104 F.2d 865 (Sd Cir. 1939).
35 Arctic Ice Mach. Co. v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 1223 (1931), modified &, aff'd,
67 F.2d 983 (6th Cir. 1933).
36 Rev. Rul. 57-518, 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 253, 254.
37 Moffatt v. Commissioner, 363 F.2d 262, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1016 (1967): "In the setting of a service organization such as a consulting engineering
operation, the retention of physical non-operating assets such as land should not cloud
the fact that the essential tangible and intangible assets of one corporation have been
transferred to another ...."; James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295, 309 (1964): "Thus, it will
be seen that as a result of the transactions ... [the acquiring company] either acquired
title to, or the use of, all the assets essential to the conduct of the business .... "; see
National Bank of Commerce v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 887 (E.D. Va. 1958).
38 Payson v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1948); Harden Taylor, 43 B.T.A.
563 (1941), aff'd, 128 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1942); Rev. Rul. 57-518, 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 253.
If Home Antiques needed to retain some liquid assets and continue in existence for an
indefinite period to terminate liabilities, its position would be strengthened not only
as to the "substantially all" requirement, but also as to the step transaction analysis. See
text accompanying note 48 infra.
39 The House Report on the 1954 Revenue Act contained the provisions within
§ 359 (§ 368 in the Code as enacted) that "substantially all" be eliminated and that 80%
of the transferor's assets be substituted. It also suggested that retained assets only be
permitted to be used for payment of liabilities. H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 31, at A
133. Both of these provisions were rejected by Congress.
40 Britt v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 10 (4th Cir. 1940). See Rev. Proc. 66-34, 1966-2
Cum. BULL. 1232, in which the Commissioner returned to the statistical approach by
prescribing 90% of net assets and 70% of gross assets as sufficient to warrant a ruling by
the Commissioner that the "substantially all" requirement was satisfied in a specific case.
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the retained assets to continue in business. Thus, the "substantially
all" test can be met within a combination of sections 333 and 368.41
B. ""Step Transactions"
The court-developed step transaction analysis presents a challenge
to the proposed combination. If this analysis is applied, the liquidation
will be incorporated into the reorganization and the appreciated assets
will be treated as section 356 "boot." The purpose of the step transac-
tion doctrine is to prevent corporations from circumventing the rigid
rules for reorganization under section 368 by establishing sham cor-
porations or transferring property prior to or subsequent to the re-
organization. The analysis has been variously applied and interpreted,
and several tests have emerged: the timing test, the intention of the
parties or "end results" test, and the interdependence test.42
Although no one test has been agreed upon by the courts, the
interdependence test, first established in American Bantam Car Co.,43
has received the widest application. The Tax Court stated the inter-
dependence test in Southwell Combing Co.:44
It is well settled that where a transaction is comprised of a
series of interdependent steps, that is to say, where the legal rela-
tionships created by any one step would have been fruitless without
the completion of the entire series, the various steps are to be
41 See generally Pomeroy, "C" Reorganizations-Exchange of Stock for Assets, 19
CAsE W. Rrs. L. REv. 998, 1001-06 (1968). The "substantially all" requirement does place
a practical limitation on the use of this combination. See p. 675 infra.
42 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(c) (1955):
A scheme, which involves an abrupt departure from normal reorganization pro-
cedure in connection with a transaction on which the imposition of tax is im-
minent, such as a mere device that puts on the form of a corporate reorganization
as a disguise for concealing its real character, and the object and accomplishment
of which is in the consummation of a preconceived plan having no business or
corporate purpose, is not a plan of reorganization.
See generally Gutkin, Step Transactions, N.Y.U. 9TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 1219, 1219-20
(1951); Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, N.Y.U. 12M
INsT. ON FED. TAx. 247, 249-53 (1954).
In a recent Supreme Court case, the "binding commitment" test was established, but
the effect of this ruling is unclear. Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968). The
interesting aspect of this case is that the taxpayer urged application of step transaction
analysis while the Commissioner opposed it on the ground that the second step could
not be integrated into the first unless there was a binding commitment to take the second
step. Such a reversal of roles casts some doubt on the value of the decision as precedent.
See Jacobs, Supreme Court Further Restricts the Step Transaction Doctrine, 29 J. TAxATION
2 (1968).
43 11 T.C. 897 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920
(1950).
44 30 T.C. 487 (1958).
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integrated into one for the purpose of arriving at the tax conse-
quences of the transaction.45
Surely, the two transactions completed by Home Antiques were not
interrelated in this sense. If the reorganization were invalid, the liqui-
dation would still serve a useful purpose; likewise, if the liquidation
were invalid the reorganization would still be important to the corpo-
rations involved.
The timing test creates the presumption that transactions closely
related in time are interdependent, 46 and the end results test focuses
"upon whether the result which the parties intended to accomplish by
the series of steps conforms to the terms of the statute. ' 47 In the Home
Antiques transactions, no sham corporations were established and nei-
ther intention to circumvent nor actual circumvention was manifested.
Temporal proximity of the two transactions would occur only in the
event that Home Antiques has no outstanding liabilities to satisfy after
the reorganization.48
Besides the tests employed, the theory behind the use of the step
transaction analysis should be examined. The courts that have used
this analysis when integrating prior and subsequent transactions with an
attempted reorganization would deny reorganization treatment for
failure to meet the technical statutory and judicial requirements-the
"substantially all" test, the "continuity of interest" requirement, and
the "solely for voting stock" requirement.49 And a series of transactions
has been analyzed together for the purpose of establishing a reorganiza-
tion when, by a series of steps, a taxpayer has tried to avoid reorga-
nization treatment.50 The courts have yet to decide, however, whether
a subsequent transaction should be incorporated into a valid reorganiza-
tion when the reorganization would be valid both with or without that
subsequent transaction.51 If the subsequent transaction were a qualified
45 Id. at 497.
46 Mintz & Plumb, supra note 42, at 249; see Love v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 236
(3d Cir. 1940); cf. D.W. Douglas, 37 B.T.A. 1122 (1938).
47 Mintz & Plumb, supra note 42, at 250 (footnote omitted).
48 See note 38 supra.
49 E.g., Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 95 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 305
U.S. 605 (1938). The judicially created "continuity of interest" requirement ensures that the
owners of the acquired corporation retain a degree of ownership in the acquiring corpora-
tion as a result of the reorganization.
50 E.g., Piedmont Financial Co., 26 B.T.A. 1221 (1932).
51 The only similar cases are those referred to at notes 14-15 supra, concerning spin-
offs prior to a valid reorganization. In those two cases neither of the appellate courts
relied on a step transaction analysis for its decision.
A simpler step transaction argument for the Commissioner would be to ignore the
liquidation entirely and treat all distributions subsequent to the reorganization as "in
pursuance" of the reorganization. Cf. D.W. Douglas, 37 B.T.A. 1122 (1938).
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one, the purpose for integrating it with a valid reorganization would"
be non-existent.
III
THE EquiTEs OF THE COMBINATION
The Commissioner could also argue that Home Antiques is manip-
ulating two relief sections of the Code to avoid imposition of tax upon
John Elderly. Relief sections should be strictly construed, he would
point out, because they provide exceptions from normal tax conse-
quences. The taxpayer, nevertheless, can retort with forceful argu-
ments of his own.
First, Elderly and Home Antiques are merely using the Code to
their best possible advantage-a well-recognized and oft-applauded en-
deavor. The courts have declared that one may avoid certain taxation
by skillful manipulation of the Code without being cited for evasion. 52
Second, the combination herein proposed does not represent a major
"loophole" in the Code because limitations are imposed by the re-
quirements of the relevant sections. The "substantially all" require-
ment restricts the amount of retained properties to a minimum and
the type of properties to non-essential operating assets. The elections
required for section 333 liquidations suggest the need for a dose-knit
group of shareholders, and the one-month liquidation period further
limits the type of corporations to which the combination can apply.
Most importantly, the corporation must have little or no accumulated
earnings and profits. The government thus will not be swamped by
corporations seeking large tax savings.
Third, Elderly belongs to the particular class of taxpayers that
sections 333 and 368 were meant to relieve. Congress first established
section 333 to aid the taxpayer who found the corporate form of busi-
ness unprofitable or inconvenient and desired to leave that form while
retaining his assets.53 Section 333, as permanently enacted into the
1954 Code, offers Elderly this relief by not recognizing gain on ap-
preciated properties at the time of liquidation.54 Section 368 provides
the taxpayer with several methods to change his form of business-he
may consolidate, sell out, recapitalize, or merge. When Home Antiques
transferred "substantially all" of its assets to National and distributed
52 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 US. 465, 469 (1935): "The legal right of a taxpayer to
decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by
means which the law permits, cannot be doubted."
53 83 CONG. Rc. 5171-72 (1938). See note 2 supra.
54 CODE § 333(e)(1).
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the National stock it received in exchange, Elderly continued an in-
terest in the antiques business, albeit in modified form. In this cir-
cumstance Congress intended that he might postpone the tax. 5
Finally, Elderly receives no tax advantage through the proposed
combination which would not have accrued to him if Home Antiques
had transferred all of its assets to National in a "C" reorganization
or if Home Antiques had simply liquidated under section 333. In the
reorganization, Elderly would receive a proportionately greater amount
of stock from National, but still without the recognition of gain. In
the liquidation, Elderly would receive all of the antiques, the client
lists, the accounts receivable, and the real estate without the recognition
of gain. In both situations the gain is the same, and the tax treatment
is equivalent. In the proposed combination, Elderly receives some stock
and a small amount of property yet the gain remains the same as in
each of the above transactions.
CONCLUSION
The history and construction of Subchapter C sections as well as
the acceptance of a section 355 and section 368 combination point the
way to a combination of sections 333 and 368. The spin-off-reorganiza-
tion cases should warn those attempting the proposed combination
that there must be strict compliance with all sections involved. Cor-
porations should also be aware that the step transaction doctrine, al-
though muted in the spin-off cases, may be pressed with vigor as the
major remaining argument that the Commissioner can urge.
Dominick A. Mazzagetti
55 See Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955).
